The real distinction we need to make for ethical clarity is not that between the individual and society, or even between "egoism" and "altruism," but between interests in the short run and those in the long run. This distinction is made constantly in modern economics. It is in large part the basis for the condemnation by economists of such policies as tariffs, subsidies, price-fixing, rent control, crop supports, featherbedding, deficit-financing, and inflation. Those who say mockingly that "in the long run we are all dead" are just as irresponsible as the French aristocrats whose reputed motto was Après nous le déluge.
I hadn't even reached the latter half of the paragraph before the obvious objection occurred to me. Despite Hazlitt's claim that in the long run our interests align, the fact is that may take longer than our lifetimes to occur.
We don't exist in some sort of spherical cow universe where everyone lives forever. People die. They get old and start to fall apart. Practically speaking, if our interests don't align within the span of a few decades, then acknowledging this doesn't accomplish anything. The allowable period during which our interests must align only shrinks as we get older.
Perhaps this matters less when everyone is having children (assuming the interest of a parent and child align perfectly, which they don't). Long-term problem solving gets a higher priority when you're focused on "leaving a better future for our children" or some such drivel. But we aren't living in such a culture, so that defense is weak at best.
Dismissing those concerned about long-term coordination failures is not a terribly good sign this early in the book. So far it's been thought-provoking, but I'll have to keep reading and see if that persists.
Update 12 Nov 15: Upon finishing the chapter, Hazlitt does briefly address this issue:
Stay tuned.
Update 12 Nov 15: Upon finishing the chapter, Hazlitt does briefly address this issue:
In applying the Long-Run Principle, in other words, we must apply it with a certain amount of common sense. We must confine ourselves to consideration of the relevant long run, the finite and reasonably cognizable long run. This is the grain of truth in Keynes's cynical dictum that "In the long run we are all dead." That long run we may no doubt justifiably ignore. We cannot see into eternity.Such a short paragraph doesn't do the issue justice, but we're not done with the long run:
We shall reserve until later chapters the detailed illustration and application of the Long-Run Principle. Here we are still concerned with the epistemological or theoretical foundations of ethics rather than with casuistry or detailed practical guidance. But it is now possible to take the next step from the theoretical to the practical. It is one of the most important implications of the Long-Run Principle (and one that Bentham, strangely, failed explicitly to recognize) that we must act, not by attempting separately in every case to weigh and compare the probable specific consequences of one moral decision or course of action as against another, but by acting according to some established general rule or set of rules. This is what is meant by acting according to principle. It is not the consequences (which it is impossible to know in advance) of a specific act that we have to consider, but the probable long-run consequences of following a given rule of action.
Stay tuned.
